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Abstract. The prevalence of computer and the internet has brought forth the 
increasing spate of cybercrime activities; hence the need for evidence to attribute a 
crime to a suspect. The research therefore, centres on evidence, the legal standards 
applied to digital evidence presented in court and the main sources of evidence in the 
Windows operating system, such as the Registry, slack space and the Windows event 
log. In order to achieve the main aim  of this research, cybercrime activities such as 
automated password guessing attack and hacking was emulated on to a Windows 
operating system within a virtual network environment set up using VMware 
workstation. After the attack the event logs on the victim system was analysed and 
assessed for its admissibility (evidence must conform to certain legal rules), and 
weight (evidence must convince the court that the accused committed the crime).  
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1   Introduction 
The proliferation of computer and network systems has brought forth the 
increasing spate of cyber crime (Wang, 2006). The Windows operating 
system is the most prevalent; therefore, Windows users bear the brunt of 
most cyber crimes (Dashora et al., 2010). Criminals constantly devise a 
variety of technique to perpetrate crime; and are constantly updating their 
skills subsequently, the need for measures to investigate how computer 
crimes are committed and mechanisms for identifying suspects, in order to 
present evidence needed for successful prosecution is vital to mitigating 
cyber crime. The need for technology to combat cyber crime has therefore 
conceived computer forensics (Wang, Cannady and Rosenbluth, 2005).  
“Computer forensics can be summarised as the process of collecting 
preserving, analysing and presenting the computer-related evidence in a 
manner that is legally acceptable in court” (Abdullah et al. 2008, pp.215).  
Evidences gathered during forensic investigation could be used in criminal 
cases such as in intellectual property theft and other civil cases.  
     However, for evidence to be admitted in court it has to satisfy two test 
which is the admissibility (evidence must conform to certain legal rules) and 
weight (evidence should sufficiently convince the court that the crime is 
committed by the accused). The admissibility test requires that evidence 
conform to certain legal rules such as authenticity and reliability, best 
evidence rule and hearsay rule (Sommer, 1999). After evidence is admitted 
in court, its weight is assessed to determine its probative value (Casey, 
2004). The Windows operating system preserves a pool of data from which 
investigators can obtain evidence pertinent to a case under investigation 
(StrathclydeForensics, n.d.). Evidence related to cybercrime activities can be 
found locations such as, Registry, Slack space and the Windows event log 
(Steel, 2006).   
     The Windows event log is the most important source of evidence during 
digital forensic investigation of a Windows system because the log files 
connect certain events to a particular point in time (Schuster, 2007). An 
event in Windows Event log is an entity that describes some interesting 
occurrence in a computer system (Stallings and Brown,  2008, pp. 486). For 
instance event log is generated when an operating system starts, stops or 
fails, when a user attempts to access system resource or logged on to a 
computer etc. To the digital forensic investigator event logs is of enormous 
benefit as it provides a detailed step by step account of activities that 
occurred in a system. By investigating the event logs incidence response 
team could tell whether an attempt to intrude a system succeeded or not. 
(Vivienne and Sutherland,  2005).  
     The objective of any investigation is to identify evidence that is needed 
to attribute a crime to the perpetrator. This can be achieved by unveiling 
information that links a crime to a suspect. It can be used to support or to 
refute the occurrence of a crime and also to provide useful information in 
proving the intent of committing a crime, which is key to prosecution 
(Casey, 2004). This paper therefore, aims to discuss legal requirements of 
evidence and then discuss the sufficiency of the Windows event log as 
source of evidence in digital forensics. 
 
 
2  Legal requirement for Evidence  
     The legal requirement for evidence is that it satisfies two tests: 
admissibility (evidence must be in conformity to certain legal rules) and 
weight (must be understood and must be convincing enough to the court).  
2.1 Admissibility: The general standard for admissibility of evidence is to 
prove that the evidence is relevant, authentic and reliable It is also 
required that evidence satisfy the best evidence rule  and does not 
contain hearsay unless if it is classified as an exception to the hearsay 
prohibition rule before it is  admitted as evidence in court (Kenneally, 
2004).  
2.1.1 Authentic and reliable: The requirements for the authentication of 
evidence to satisfy the court are:  
• The evidence was not altered during collection and  
• It actually comes from the claimed source – human or machine. 
• Supplementary information such as date of record to be used as 
evidence is accurate. (Casey 2004). 
     Two steps are involved in authenticating digital evidence. The first step 
involves the examination of the evidence to determine whether it is what the 
proponent purports and that it originates from the claimed source. 
Authenticity of digital evidence can be verified if the person who has 
collected the evidence testifies that the integrity of the evidence has been 
maintained and that the evidence originates from the claimed source.  The 
second step of the authentication process involves analysis of the evidence 
to ascertain its probative value (Casey, 2004). Digital evidence is acceptable 
in court if a witness who is versed in computer operation can testify that the 
evidence is authentic and reliable (Kenneally, 2004). 
     After evidence is authenticated and accepted in court its reliability is 
evaluated to ascertain its probative value. The evidence must be cogent and 
understandable (Sommer,1999). Doubts regarding the integrity of evidence 
reduce the weight of evidence in court Digital evidence is acceptable in 
court if the party presenting it can prove that the information is reliable and 
the reliability can be verified by the opposing party in court (Ryan and 
Shpantzer, 2002).  
 
 
2.1.2 Satisfy the best evidence rule:  
     Writing - The best evidence rule requires that original evidence to be 
provided before evidence is acceptable in court. Evidence in the form of 
writing is required to satisfy the best evidence rule. However, because exact 
and accurate copies of the original evidence can be made, duplicate copies 
are now acceptable and since computers are capable of producing an 
accurate copy of the digital evidence, printout of digital evidence are usually 
acceptable in court.   
     Hearsay – the rule of hearsay is applicable to all evidence unless it falls 
within exception to the hearsay prohibition. According to Casey 2004 pp179 
“Evidence contained in a document is hearsay if the document is produced 
to prove that a statement made in court is true”. For example, e-mail 
message may be used to demonstrate that an individual made a statement 
but it cannot be used to prove the veracity of the content of the e-mail 
(Casey, 2004).Digital evidence is classified as computer generated or 
computer stored or hybrid.   
Computer generated- this is evidence consisting of output from a computer 
program e.g., ATM receipt phone records. Courts admit computer generated 
record providing an expert witness testifies that the computer that generated 
the record produced an accurate result and was functioning properly 
(Kenneally, 2004). 
     Computer Stored- Computer stored evidence are electronic data 
consisting the writing and statement of an individual e.g. e-mail, business 
correspondence. Computer stored evidence has more ambiguous standard of 
authenticity than computer generated. Requirements of some court are that 
the same standard of authenticating physical document be applied to 
computer stored – advocates must demonstrate firsthand knowledge of the 
evidence. 
     Hybrid- hybrid combines the features of both computer generated and 
computer stored. Computer generated records are classified under the 
business record exception to hearsay rule prohibition. Computer generated 
data are not regarded as hearsay as they do not consist of human statement 
rather they document an action (Casey, 2004). 
     2.2 Weight: The weight of evidence is a non-scientific concept. After 
evidence is accepted in court the next step of the evaluation process is to 
assess its weight. There isn’t any classification of evidence that a court is 
compelled to accept. The differences between admissibility and weight are 
unclear especially in scientific evidence. In assessing the weight of evidence 
a number of features are put into consideration. Based on these features the 
weight evidence carries is determined.  
      2.2.1 Authenticity- the evidence is connected to the circumstances and 
the suspect. 
     2.2.2 Accuracy- evidence must be convincing and error free; evidence 
must be acquired using standard accepted procedure by an expert who is 
able to explain the procedure (Sommer, 1999).  
2.2.3 Completeness- evidence must be capable of telling in- its- term the 
whole event that occurred (Sommer, 1999). 
     2.2.4 Clear Chain of custody- in assessing the weight of evidence the 
manner in which evidence is handled right from collection to the time is 
presented to court put into consideration. All people who handled the 
evidence and actions performed on the evidence should be documented. The 
condition of the evidence at the time of collection   should be described. 
     2.2.5 Transparency of forensic procedure- The forensic procedures 
should be transparent such that a third party can follow the same method 
and arrive at the same conclusion (Sommer, 1999). 
3  Legal standards applied to digital logs 
 
Because digital logs are used as evidence in court, it is therefore, required 
that the logs satisfy legal standards applied to evidence. As discussed earlier 
evidence are generally required to conform to certain legal rules before 
being admitted as evidence. The rules require that evidence is authentic, 
reliable and relevant. Also required is that evidence does not contain hearsay 
and that it satisfies the rule of best evidence. 
     3.1 Authentication and log evidence: It has been discussed earlier that 
evidence is authentic if originates from the claimed source and that its 
integrity has not been compromised. The rule applies to log evidence as 
well. As earlier discussed computer evidence is classified in court as 
computer-generated, computer stored or hybrid. Based on this classification 
the court determines how to scrutinize digital log before admittance. There 
is no over-arching prescription for classifying digital logs therefore; its 
admissibility is open to case by case decision. For computer generated 
record, Courts admit computer generated record providing an expert witness 
testifies that the computer that generated the record produced an accurate 
result and was functioning properly. 
     3.2 Log and best evidence rule: as discussed earlier the best evidence 
rule requires that evidence is original before it is admissible in court. The 
standard is applied to ensure its credibility. In the case of computer record, 
printouts or other output that exactly represent that they are regarded as 
original. Therefore, accurate printout of computer records is accepted as 
evidence in court. Digital logs satisfy the best evidence rule if the MD5 
hashes of the original and the copy matches. 
     3.3 Digital log and hearsay: The application of the rule of hearsay to 
digital logs depends on the way a court classifies the log- computer 
generated, computer stored or hybrid. As described earlier. Computer 
generated are classified under the business record exception to hearsay 
prohibition rule (Kenneally, 2004). Computer generated records have been 
classified as non hearsay because its proponent have been able to 
demonstrate to the court that the records are merely the product of a 
computer operating under a set of programme with no human intervention 
(Casey 2004). 
 
4 Methodology 
      In order to achieve the objective of this paper, analysing the sufficiency 
of the Windows event log as evidence in digital forensic investigation, 
experiments were conducted within a virtual network environment. The 
virtual network was set up using VMware workstation. Within the virtual 
network configuration, cyber crime related activities were emulated to 
determine the sufficiency of the Windows event log in providing evidence 
of the attack. The cyber crime activity emulated involves password guessing 
attack with the aid of the Net Essential tools. 
     Essential Net Tools used to conduct the password guessing attack on the 
target system (Window Server 2003 domain controller). Net Essential tool 
contains a variety of network auditing tool, which includes NetBIOS 
Auditing Tool. NetBIOS Auditing Tool is used to audit a system that offers 
NetBIOS file sharing service. It also offers password guessing functionality.  
NAT is a GUI tool with an interface that requires user to supply the starting 
IP address and the stopping IP address of the target system. NAT attempts to 
crack the target system by trying a combination of predefined username and 
password. Figure 4.1 – 4.3 displays result of the attack. 
  
Fig. (4.1): a total of 181 passwords checked on target- Windows Server 2003 domain 
controller (STUDENT-AKVC6OJ). 
 
Fig. (4.2): Administrator password found on victim computer.  
 
Fig. (4.3): password for user (nurex113) found. 
5 Analysis of the Event Logs for Evidence of Attack 
     The previous section shows that an automated password guessing attack 
was conducted on a Windows Server 2003 server using NetBIOS Auditing 
Tool (NAT). The attack involved connecting to an enumerated share (IPC$, 
C$) on a target (Windows Server 2003) domain controller and then 
attempting to crack the target with a combination of guessed username and 
password. During the attack process, a total of 181 passwords were checked 
(fig 4.1). On completion of the attack five shares including the C$ and 
ADMIN$   were enumerated on the victim system. A total of eleven users 
were enumerated (fig 4.3). Passwords for administrator account and a user 
(nurex113) was discovered on the victim system   (fig 4.2 and 4.3). 
     In this section, the event log is analysed for evidence of activities that 
occurred during the attack. The attack involved an automated password 
guessing, therefore, a series of username and password combination will be 
used by the attacker in attempt to authenticate and logon to the target 
system. As authentication and logon events are recorded under the account 
logon and logon events the analysis will be focused on the events generated 
under the account logon and logon category of the security log in the victim 
system. 
     5.1 Examination of the Security Log on the Victim Computer for 
Evidence of Failed Account Logon Events: As the victim computer is a 
Window Server 2003 domain controller, both account logon and logon 
events will be recorded in the security log of the victim computer. The 
account logon event logs only authentication events (Microsoft, 
2011).Because the attack was conducted from a local account and Microsoft 
uses NTLM to authenticate local accounts; Event ID 680 was filtered in 
order to search for failed NTLM authentication as shown in figure (5.1). A 
series of failed account logon event was discovered in the security log of 
victim system. A large number of failed authentications appearing in the 
security log of the victim computer is a clear sign that the computer was 
under an automated password guessing attack. In order to obtain more 
information on the attack, some of the entries were examined to find any 
correlation between the events as shown in the figure (5.2). 
 
 Fig (5.1): a series of failed authentication in security log of victim system. 
          
Fig (5.2): Event ID 680 recorded when the attacker successfully logon to the 
victim system 
     5.2 Examining the Victim System for Evidence of a Successful 
Authentication (Account Logon): As shown above, the attacker hacked 
into the passwords of the administrator (Administrator) and the user 
(nurex113) accounts; subsequently the attacker successfully authenticated to 
the victim. In Windows Server 2003, Event ID 680 is used to record both 
failed and successful NTLM authentication. Event ID 680 with success 
audit was recorded in the security log of the victim system as shown in fig 
(5.3) and (5.4). The event logs generated in fig (5.3) and (5.4) also provides 
evidence that the attacker has successfully guessed two passwords from the 
target system.  
  
Fig. (5.3): Event ID 680 recorded when the attacker successfully guessed 
and logon with the user account nurex113. 
Fig. (5.4): Event ID 680 recorded when the attacker successfully logon to 
the victim system. 
     5.3 Examining the Victim system for Evidence of Failed Logon 
Events: Logon event is generated when a user is attempting to access a 
resource on a computer. Before a user can logon to a computer the user must 
be authenticated. If the authentication (account logon) succeeds then the 
user is granted access (logon) to a system. If, however, the authentication 
fails the user is denied access to the system. The authentication process and 
the resulting event generated have been discussed in the previous section. 
This section discusses the evidence provided by the Windows event log due 
to failed logon.  A large number of failed logon events are also recorded in 
the security log of the victim system and they are an indication that an 
unauthorised person is attempting to logon to the target system. After 
filtering for Event ID 529 in the security log, a large number of failed logon 
events were revealed. A security log full of failed logon events is a sign that 
the computer is under an automated password guessing attack as shown in 
fig. (5.5). However, In order to obtain more information on the failed logon, 
some of the entries was viewed and examined as shown in fig (5.6) and 
(5.7). 
 
Fig (5.5): a series of failed logon events in security log of victim system. 
Fig (5.6): Event ID 529 showing failed logon for user nurex113. 
Fig (5.7): The bottom of description field for the same Event ID 529. 
     5.4 Examining the Victim System for Evidence of Successful Logon 
Events: As demonstrated above, the attacker has successfully obtained the 
password for two accounts, the administrator account and the user account 
(nurex113) and subsequently logon with their credentials.  This results in an 
Event ID 540 to be logged in the victim computer. Event ID 540 indicates 
that the attacker logged on from a network .Figures (5.8) and (5.9) below 
shows event generated as a result of a successful logon. 
Fig (5.8): Event ID 540 showing successful logon for user account 
administrator. 
Fig (5.9): The bottom of description field for the same Event ID 540.  
 
 6 Evaluating the Sufficiency of the Windows Event Log as 
Evidence 
In the previous sections, the security log of the victim system has been 
examined and analysed for evidence of the cyber crime activities emulated. 
In this section the evidence obtained are analysed to determine whether they 
satisfy the legal standard applied to digital logs and evidence in general. It 
has been mentioned earlier that evidence is required to satisfy two test 
(admissibility and weight).The admissibility requirement is that evidence 
satisfy some legal rule such as authenticity, best evidence rule and the 
hearsay rule. The weight of evidence is assessed based on how the evidence 
is able to convince the court that the accused is guilty.  
6.1  Admissibility of the Windows Event log as Evidence: 
• Authenticity of the Windows Event log: Evidence provided by 
the Windows event log is admissible if it can be proven that the 
evidence is from the claimed source. This can be confirmed by 
examining the logs generated from the attack. The computer field 
of each of the events generated shows that the logs were generated 
by the victim system (STUDENT_AKVC0J).This proves that the 
logs were authentic and actually originates from the source. 
• The Windows Event log and the hearsay rule: Log evidence is 
classified as computer generated. computer generated records are 
classified as an exception to the hearsay prohibition rule 
(Kenneally, 2004); therefore, the Windows event log  falls under 
the classification of the hearsay exception prohibition as it is 
generated by a computer that is operating under a set of program. 
• The Windows Event log and the Best Evidence Rule: It has been 
discussed that earlier that log evidence satisfy the best evidence 
rule and because the Windows event log falls under the category of 
log evidence, it therefore satisfies the best evidence rule. 
6.2 Weight: As discussed earlier, the criteria used in assessing the weight of 
evidence is that the evidence provides sufficient information needed to 
convince the court that the crime was perpetrated by the accused (Sommer, 
1999). Therefore, in this section the weight of the evidence provided by the 
Windows Event log after each of the attacks is evaluated. 
• Evaluating the Weight of the Windows Event log for the 
Password Guessing Attack: Evidence carries much weight if it 
can be linked to the circumstances and the suspect and also, if can 
tell in its own term the whole story of the activities performed by 
the attacker. (Sommer, 1999). This section will therefore analyse 
whether the evidence provided by the Windows event log can be 
linked to the circumstances of the crime and whether it tells the 
details scenario needed to reconstruct the events that occurred 
during the incident. After the examination and analysis of the 
password guessing attack demonstrated above, it was discovered 
that the Windows event log tells the complete story of the 
attacker’s activities. It provides the following information about the 
attack: 
 
• From the security log of the victim system a series of failed 
authentication activities and failed   logon activities were 
discovered and this provides evidence that the victim system was 
under a password guessing attack. 
• Careful examination of the logs further revealed that the attacker 
has enumerated some user account on the victim system and 
attempted to logon with their credentials. This evidence was 
obtained from viewing the entries of failed account logon and 
logon events. 
• It also provided evidence that the attacker successfully cracked the 
victim system and discovered passwords for 2 users as previously 
discussed. This evidence was obtained from the successful logon 
and account logon events (figure 5.3 and 5.8). 
• It provided the attacker workstation as WIN2K8 (figure 5.8) 
• It provided the IP address of the attacker as 192.168.100.15 as 
shown in figure (5.9). 
In conclusion, the analysis of the Windows event log proves that it provides 
all the evidence needed to reconstruct the activities performed during the 
password guessing attack and also to link the attack to the actual perpetrator. 
Hence, it will carry much weight in court. 
 
7 Conclusion 
This paper has investigated the question of sufficiency of windows event 
logs in serving as digital forensics evidence that could be accepted in the 
court of law. it has been discussed that evidence must satisfy two the 
admissibility and weight test The admissibility test requires that evidence 
conform to certain legal standard such as authenticity, reliability and that the 
evidence most not contain hearsay. After evidence is admitted in court its 
weight is accessed to determine its probative value. In evaluating the weight 
evidence, what is most considered is that the evidence be able to convince 
the court that the offence was perpetrated by the accused. cyber crime 
activities were emulated on a Windows Server 2003. The cyber crime 
activities emulated involved password guessing attack and exploitation of 
the Windows network service.  
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